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Implications of Integrated Commodity
Programs and Crop Insurance
Keith H. Coble and Barry J. Barnett
Moving from price-triggered to area revenue–triggered programs was perhaps the most
common theme among 2007 farm bill proposals. Area revenue–triggered commodity
programs may make farm-level revenue insurance products seem redundant, raising
questions about why the federal government should continue both programs.A r e a
revenue–triggered programs would remove much of the systemic risk faced by producers.
As a result, private sector insurers may be able to insure the residual risk without federal
involvement. This paper examines the effects of moving to area revenue–triggered
commodity programs with a focus on public policy issues that would likely arise.
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For decades, the commodity title of the farm
bill has focused on price-triggered agricultural
support programs that protect crop producers
from price risk. Loan Deficiency Payments
(LDPs) and Counter-Cyclical Payments
(CCPs) represent the most recent permutations
of these programs. Of course, crop agriculture
is also beset by production risk caused by
extreme weather, insects, disease, and other
perils. Traditionally, the federal government
has provided U.S. producers with subsidized
crop insurance—and frequently ad hoc disaster
payments—to assist with production risk.
Combining federal price and production
risk programs into a revenue risk program was
considered as early as 1983 (Offutt and Lins).
Later, Miranda and Glauber (1991) proposed
an area revenue–triggered program as an
alternative to ad hoc disaster payments and
Babcock and Hartproposedreplacingthe LDP
and CCP programs with an area revenue–
triggered program. Efforts by Midwestern
groups to promote a revenue-triggered com-
modity program failed during the 1996 farm
bill debate but did contribute to the initiation
ofcroprevenueinsurance introducedthatsame
year. Farm-level (and later, county-level) rev-
enue insurance programs rapidly captured
significant market share and for 2007 together
accounted for 79%,7 7 %,a n d7 5 % of insured
corn, wheat, and soybean acres, respectively.
In addition to its role in providing commod-
ity programs (LDPs, CCPs, and fixed direct
payments) and ad hoc disaster payments, the
federal government also facilitates the offer of
crop yield and revenue insurance products. The
government provides premium subsidies that
reduce the premium cost to insured farmers and
reimburses private insurance companies for the
Administrative and Operating (A&O) costs of
selling and servicing crop insurance policies.
The federal government also provides reinsur-
ance at favorable terms to the private insurance
companies that sell federal crop insurance
policies. The potential for widespread systemic
losses that could undermine the financial
solvency of private crop insurance companies
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the federal role in providing reinsurance on
crop insurance policies (Glauber and Collins;
Kramer; Miranda and Glauber 1997).
Several 2007 farm bill proposals focused on
replacing some portion of price-triggered
commodity programs with programs that
make payments when the average revenue
over a geographic area falls short of expected
or target levels. Coble and Barnett note that
among these proposals were those that trig-
gered payments due to shortfalls in county
(National Corn Growers), state (Senate Com-
mittee on Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry
and American Farm Bureau) and national
(USDA, House Committee on Agriculture,
and American Farmland Trust) revenue.
Given the widespread use of crop revenue
insurance and the likelihood of new area
revenue–triggered commodity programs, it is
important to consider whether these programs
are duplicative or can be made to complement
each other. Some farm bill proposals (e.g., the
National Corn Growers) suggested ‘‘wrapping’’
farm-level insurance around an area revenue–
triggered commodity program (Babcock and
Paulson). With a wrapped insurance product,
any payment received from the underlying area
revenue–triggered commodity program would
be deducted from the indemnity due on an
associated farm-level revenue insurance policy.
In principle, the area revenue–triggered com-
modity program would provide protection
against systemic loss events (such as drought)
while the farm-level policy would protect
against residual, idiosyncratic losses.
The premium for wrapped insurance should
be less than for current farm-level revenue
insurancesincetheunderlyingrevenue-triggered
commodity program would cover some risks
currently indemnified by the insurance policy.
Both the premium subsidy and the A&O reim-
bursement are percentages of the total premium
cost of the insurance policy. Thus, wrapping
cropinsurance policiesaround an arearevenue–
triggered commodity program would also re-
duce federal outlays for premium subsidies and
A&O reimbursements (Coble and Dismukes).
The central question addressed in this paper
is whether wrapping insurance around area
revenue–triggered commodity programs would
eliminate, or at least reduce, the need for a
federal role in providing reinsurance on crop
insurance policies. Miranda and Glauber
(1997) examined the potential for the federal
government to use area (state and national)
yield-triggered reinsurance contracts to rein-
sure farm-level yield insurance policies. They
found that state-level yield-triggered reinsur-
ance contracts would allow insurance compa-
nies to reduce their portfolio risk on crop
insurance policies to levels that were compara-
ble to lines of insurance that were sold without
federal involvement. Similarly, Vedenov, Ep-
person, and Barnett analyzed the potential for
reinsuring Georgia cotton crop insurance using
catastrophe bonds based on state-level yields.
They found that the bonds could reduce the
varianceofcropinsurancelossratiosforcotton
crop insurance in the state by as much as 56%.
This study extends previous work by explic-
itlyexaminingthe extentto which an underlying
area revenue–triggered commodity program
can transfer systemic production risks to the
federal government. To the extent that the
underlying commodity program can transfer
these locally nondiversifiable risks, a wrapped
farm-level insurance policy need only protect
against residual, idiosyncratic risks that, at least
in principle, should be diversifiable within a
portfolio of wrapped crop insurance policies—
thus undermining the primary historic argu-
ment for federal involvement in providing
reinsurance on crop insurance policies.
1 Specif-
ically, we analyze the distribution of state-level
1Other arguments have also been used to rational-
ize the role of the federal government in providing
reinsurance. The federal government (not the reinsured
private insurance companies)establishes premium rates
for all crop insurance policies. Further, to address the
political goal of universal availability, the private
insurance companies are required to sell crop insurance
to any eligible applicant. Given these unusual condi-
tions, the reinsurance agreement allows private insur-
ance companies to adversely select against the federal
government. The companies can choose those policies
on which they wish to retain a significant amount of
premium and loss risk and those policies on which they
wish to cede most of the premium and loss risk to the
federal government (Coble, Dismukes, and Glauber;
Ker and Ergun; Mason, Hayes, and Lence; Vedenov et
al., 2004; Vedenov et al., 2006).
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wrapped farm-level crop insurance (yield insur-
ance, revenue insurance, and revenue insurance
with up-side price protection). Also three types
of underlying area revenue–triggered commod-
ity programs are considered—national, state,
and county.
Methods and Data
The model used here is designed to simulate
random yields, prices, and revenues at various
levels of aggregation. The model explicitly
accounts for correlations across different
levels of aggregation and correlation between
yields and prices at any given level of
aggregation. The analysis is based on county,
state, and national yield data and national
crop price data from USDA’s National
Agricultural Statistics Service (NASS). We
also utilize publicly available Risk Manage-
ment Agency (RMA) crop insurance data on
effective premium rates to model county-
specific farm yields. The model includes four
crops—corn, soybeans, wheat, and cotton in
every county of the United States where data
is available. The final model reflects at least
86% of U.S. acreage for each crop.
To measure variability of yields at the
county, state, and national levels, we estimat-
ed a linear time trend for each data series
using 1975–2004 data and calculated variabil-
ity from the residuals relative to the predicted
yield for 2007. Given detrended national,
state, and county yield series, we next simulate
10 representative farms for each crop/county.
The representative farms are modeled follow-
ing Miranda (1991) as:
ð1Þ ~ y yft ~ mf z b ~ y yct { mc ðÞ z eft V f [ c
where y ˜ft is the realization of the random yield
on farm f in year t, y ˜ct is the realization of the
random yield in county c in year t, mf 5 E(y ˜ft),
mc 5 E(y ˜ct), and eft is a normally distributed
error term with E(eft) 5 0a n dVar(eft) 5 s
2.
If we define vft 5 y ˜ft 2 mf and vct 5 y ˜ct 2
mc then Equation 1 can be rewritten as
ð2Þ vft ~ bvct z eft:
This demonstrates that the coefficient b
measures the responsiveness of deviations in
farm yield relative to the expected value to
deviations in county yield relative to the
expected value. The error term eft represents
idiosyncratic effects on farm yield deviations
relative to the expected value that are orthog-
onal to county yield deviations relative to the
expected value. A grid search is conducted for
the value of s (the standard deviation of eft),
which simulates current RMA effective pre-
mium rates for farm-level yield insurance at
the 65% coverage level for each crop/county
(see Coble and Dismukes for more details).
2
Within a county, different farms will have
different values of b. Thus, the representative
farms within each county are varied by
randomly drawing each farm’s b from a
normal distribution with a mean of one and
a standard deviation of 0.28, which approxi-
mates the distribution of b from Miranda.
Miranda showed that if the county yield were
truly an aggregation of all farms in the county,
then the acreage weighted average of all b’s in
the county would be equal to one. A matrix
[Y] is constructed that contains national,
state, and county yield deviations relative to
the expected value for each of the four crops.
Thus the matrix has T rows representing T
years of historical yields.
Price variability is estimated from NASS
state and national price data. National annual
marketing-year average (MYA) prices for
1974 through 2005 are used. These data are
used to estimate a percentage price change
from the previous year’s price level. State basis
adjustments from the national price are also
derived from the historical data so that state
harvest-time prices are the sum of the MYA
price and the basis. These data for the four
crops are maintained in the matrix [P], which
also has T rows of annual prices.
2Crop insurance is generally sold at the basic or
optional unit level, which is typically more disaggre-
gated than the farm. Thus, the effective premium rate
data is largely a mix of basic and optional unit rates
and captures some other risks that might not be
considered yield risk (e.g., prevented planting or
quality loss).
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obtained from NASS for the 2005 crop year
and is assumed constant throughout the
simulation period. Each of the representative
farms is assumed to represent 10% of the
planted acres in the county. Base acreage for
2002 for each county was obtained from the
Farm Service Agency. Each representative
farm is also assumed to represent 10% of the
base acres in the county. Base yields were
derived by comparing the national average
base yield with the expected yield. This ratio is
applied to the 2007 expected yield for each
county. The representative farm yield, price,
and revenue simulation is based on 350
random draws. For every location, a row is
simultaneously drawn at random from yield
matrix [Y] and price matrix [P] (i.e., all yield
deviations from trend and price changes are
drawn from the same historical year) to
maintain the empirical correlations between
prices and yields, between yields at different
levels of aggregation, and between yields in
different counties. The idiosyncratic portion of
farm yield is independently drawn for each
representative farm. Starting prices for the
simulations are determined from December
2007 futures market prices for 2008 delivery
months.
Insurance Wrapping Alternatives Examined
While several area revenue–triggered com-
modity program designs have been proposed,
this analysis focuses on the Senate average
crop revenue (ACR) option. The ACR would
provide producers with a state-level revenue-
triggered commodity program. In the analysis
presented here, we also vary the ACR design
to consider programs with national- and
county-level revenue triggers. For each year,
the ACR payment is calculated as:
ð3Þ
ACRfj ~ 0:85 | BAf |   y yf
|







V f [ j
where j designates the geographical area
(nation, state, or county) for which a payment
is triggered. Thus, ACRfj is the payment for
farm f in area j, y ¯f is the farm’s program yield
and BAf is the farm’s base acreage. The
revenue trigger is 90% of preseason expected
price, PE, times y ˆj which is a trend-adjusted
expected yield per planted acre for area j.
Revenue to count is the product of market
year average price, PMYA, and the realized
yield per planted acre for area j, yj.I ft h e
revenue to count is less than the revenue
trigger, an ACR payment is made. The
fraction in Equation 3 solves to a price
measure since the numerator is a revenue
measure and the denominator is the expected
yield per acre for area j.
Wrapping Insurance around ACR
The original Senate committee language, as
proposed in the Chairman’s mark, would have
integrated farm-level revenue insurance with
the ACR program by ‘‘wrapping’’ revenue
insurance around the ACR.
3 This implied that
ACR program payments would be deducted
from any revenue insurance indemnity pay-
ments. The ACR program would cover
systemic losses and the farm-level insurance
product would cover any residual idiosyncrat-
ic losses. We model three insurance products
assuming a farm-level insurance product with
65% coverage. The insurance products are
assumed to be actuarially fair so the federal
transfer associated with the insurance prod-
ucts is simply the premium subsidy, which is
currently 59% for 65% coverage.
4 In a given
year, the indemnity for the wrapped yield
insurance is modeled as:
ð4Þ
Wrapped APH Indemnityf ~






V f [ j
where APHf is the farm’s crop insurance
actual production history (APH) yield and
3This language was removed from the Bill passed
out of committee.
4Preliminary analysis examining other coverage
levels did not result in implications that differed from
those reported here.
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The wrapped APH indemnity is calculated by
subtracting the ACR payment from the
unwrapped insurance indemnity.
We also consider farm-level revenue insur-
ance with 65% coverage wrapped around the
ACR. For this design (designated RA) the
insurance indemnity is calculated as:
ð5Þ
Wrapped RA Indemnityf ~
max 0, PE | 65% | APHf
 
{ PH~ y yf { ACRfj

V f [ j
where PH is the harvest-time price.
We also consider farm-level revenue insur-
ance with 65% coverage and upside price
protection wrapped around the ACR. For this
design (designated CRC),
5 the insurance in-
demnity is calculated as:
ð6Þ
Wrapped CRC Indemnityf ~
max 0, max PE, PH ðÞ | 65% | APHf
 
{ PH~ y yf { ACRfj

V f [ j:
Results
The results of this analysis are potentially
voluminous since so many representative
farms are modeled simultaneously. Thus, the
simulated results are presented across the four
crops and aggregated by state and insurance
design. Of course, these scenarios do not
reflect the actual portfolios of crop insurance
companies nor is the book of business in any
state uniformly one insurance design or
coverage level. However, we present the data
by state and insurance design to demonstrate
the ceteris paribus effects of wrapping on
different regions.
Table 1 reports the effect of wrapping on
the mean of the portfolio loss cost (indemni-
ties/liability). The results are reported for each
of the three insurance designs. Note that the
mean effect on loss cost does not directly
affect the insurability of the portfolio. That is,
a portfolio of insurance policies may be low
risk or high risk, but if the aggregate losses of
the portfolio are stable then it is likely
insurable. However, in the context of the
current U.S. crop insurance program, A&O
reimbursement is a function of premiums and
premiums are constructed to reflect expected
loss cost. Thus, the amount of systemic risk
removed by wrapping around an underlying
area revenue–triggered commodity program
has implications for the A&O reimbursement
paid by the federal government to private
insurance companies.
For all three insurance designs, wrapping
around an underlying area revenue–triggered
commodity program reduces the average loss
cost. Further, the magnitude of the reduction
increases as the commodity program trigger
becomes more disaggregated. Wrapping APH
around a national revenue–triggered commod-
ity program reduces the loss cost by 8.89% on
average. Wrapping around a state revenue–
triggered commodityprogram reduces loss cost
by an average of more than 13% and wrapping
around a county revenue–triggered commodity
program reduces loss cost by an average of
18.33%. However, considerable variation is
observed by state. In general, southern states
have smaller reductions in average loss cost
while wheat-producing Plains states generally
have higher reductions in average loss cost.
The results for wrapping RA around area
revenue–triggered commodity programs are
reported in the center columns of Table 1. The
national averages show that wrapping RA
around area revenue–triggered commodity
programs reduces loss cost by about 4% more
than for APH. This occurs because, relative to
APH indemnities, RA indemnities are more
highly correlated with payments from area
revenue–triggered commodity programs. The
national revenue–triggered commodity pro-
gram tends to reduce wrapped RA loss costs
relatively more in Cornbelt states, such as
Iowa. For example in Iowa, Illinois, and
Indiana the loss cost reduction for RA is
about 50% higher than what it was for APH.
The most rightward portion of Table 1
shows the loss cost reduction from wrapping
5We recognize there is a version of revenue
assurance (RA-HPO) with up-side price protection.
However, we use the terms RA and CRC to
distinguish the two designs.
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ity programs. The weighted-average national
results show that the loss cost reduction from
wrapping CRC around an area revenue–
triggered commodity program is roughly
halfway between the loss cost reduction for
APH and RA. This result is fairly robust
across states. In general, we find that with all
three insurance products the results are
influenced by the geographical diversity of
the state. For example, moving from a
national revenue–triggered commodity pro-
gram to a state revenue–triggered program
captures much of the loss cost reduction in
Arkansas and Mississippi. There is little
further reduction associated with moving to
a county revenue–triggered commodity pro-
gram. This is likely because both states have
concentrated row crop production regions.
Conversely, in Texas crop production is
geographically diverse and thus there is
significant additional reduction in loss cost
associated with moving from state revenue–
triggered commodity programs to county
programs.
Table 2 shows how wrapping reduces the
standard deviation of loss cost. These results
directly speak to the insurability of state
portfolios. If the standard deviation of the
portfolio in a state is relatively small, then the
insurance book-of-business is relatively more
insurable. Interestingly, the effect of wrapping






































AZ 3.76 3.81 4.28 5.44 6.06 6.74 5.00 5.57 6.19
AR 4.87 6.64 7.28 6.31 8.11 8.62 5.72 7.35 7.82
CA 13.51 23.13 26.38 16.01 22.51 26.15 13.56 20.73 23.72
CO 14.20 12.41 19.61 17.10 15.23 22.85 15.04 13.55 20.31
GA 5.21 13.11 16.87 7.25 16.78 19.58 6.28 14.58 17.54
IL 7.53 8.44 13.36 14.49 15.05 19.42 11.68 12.34 16.35
IN 7.36 9.25 11.66 12.84 14.96 17.56 10.87 12.67 14.98
IA 9.33 16.94 24.93 19.60 25.64 32.66 15.24 20.96 27.11
KS 15.45 15.49 29.21 19.12 18.15 31.34 16.94 16.10 28.46
KY 7.21 9.88 11.91 10.41 13.12 14.89 9.02 11.42 13.05
LA 4.06 6.82 10.21 5.88 9.62 12.57 5.25 8.57 11.36
MI 8.80 10.61 14.40 12.53 14.57 18.50 10.91 12.67 16.14
MN 9.43 16.99 22.29 15.51 22.02 27.13 12.70 18.77 23.49
MS 8.59 14.01 14.78 14.36 21.31 22.23 11.98 17.80 18.59
MO 6.68 9.06 14.83 9.62 12.64 18.19 8.04 10.57 15.66
MT 15.08 24.11 34.14 17.20 23.96 33.48 15.89 22.62 31.85
NE 10.84 10.60 15.29 18.25 17.70 22.96 14.83 14.36 18.91
NC 5.53 8.58 11.81 8.22 11.51 14.44 7.16 10.05 12.86
ND 9.56 12.81 16.28 15.62 18.42 21.99 13.08 15.69 18.86
OH 12.59 12.62 20.66 14.67 14.07 21.63 13.76 13.17 20.65
OK 24.94 35.45 47.83 58.42 59.74 74.30 45.48 46.51 60.22
PA 5.34 12.94 20.11 8.32 13.80 20.93 6.95 12.25 18.50
SC 5.44 13.89 15.68 7.61 15.12 16.91 6.71 14.16 15.82
SD 8.73 10.85 19.47 12.24 14.41 22.50 10.60 12.72 20.03
TN 5.95 8.17 9.74 9.27 11.77 13.26 7.61 9.67 10.92
TX 6.37 10.24 22.70 7.58 11.21 23.55 6.85 10.24 21.57
VA 5.34 12.24 17.76 7.41 14.29 19.90 6.48 12.67 18.26
WI 7.18 17.18 19.66 12.61 22.05 24.66 10.71 19.46 21.77
Average 8.89 13.08 18.33 13.71 17.28 22.46 11.58 14.90 19.68
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a very similar pattern to the effect of wrapping
on the mean of loss cost. The more disaggre-
gated the underlying area revenue–triggered
commodity program, the greater the reduction
in the variability of loss cost. Further, RA
generally experiences greater reductions in the
standard deviation of loss cost that APH or
CRC. Wrapping APH around a national
revenue–triggered commodity program is
shown on average to reduce portfolio risk by
2.35%. For some states the percent reduction
is negative, indicating that wrapping actually
increases the portfolio risk—though this result
is primarily seen in states that represent
marginal production areas. Wrapping CRC
around a national revenue–triggered commod-
ity program reduces portfolio risk by 5.13%
on average, whereas the RA wrap reduces
portfolio risk by nearly 14%.
Wrapping around state revenue–triggered
commodity programs generates significantly
more reduction in portfolio risk. The reduc-
tion for APH averages 14%. For RA the
reduction averages over 27%, with several
Midwestern states achieving at least a one-
third reduction in the portfolio standard
deviation. Finally, wrapping around a county
revenue–triggered commodity program gener-
ates the greatest risk reduction. The portfolio
standard deviation falls by an average of
20.4% for APH and CRC and 33% for RA.






































AZ 23.75 23.98 23.78 11.07 12.59 12.39 4.91 5.60 5.06
AR 5.48 12.67 13.52 13.06 21.74 22.24 6.83 12.82 13.37
CA 6.47 19.86 20.05 12.20 21.37 21.87 8.67 19.75 20.55
CO 11.57 17.31 24.76 19.84 23.58 32.72 11.25 17.30 23.41
GA 1.55 15.59 17.30 5.98 31.29 32.28 2.20 16.15 17.82
IL 25.09 1.81 15.79 30.51 36.57 48.05 3.05 8.17 18.84
IN 23.51 21.11 3.39 26.26 34.26 38.88 5.22 6.83 9.81
IA 20.80 23.65 37.16 16.31 40.34 53.83 4.16 24.12 35.74
KS 17.47 25.11 43.26 28.96 38.79 55.32 17.18 24.17 39.54
KY 22.33 10.19 9.58 6.26 18.15 18.40 20.82 8.32 7.52
LA 21.50 3.13 7.15 20.88 4.72 9.22 22.46 1.29 5.34
MI 5.41 13.85 21.19 23.25 32.45 39.72 11.92 18.11 24.45
MN 20.47 29.23 35.58 11.01 45.04 49.99 1.85 28.46 34.02
MS 0.01 6.67 6.90 19.45 27.98 28.12 10.38 14.12 14.11
MO 1.52 4.76 12.22 13.43 20.00 27.18 3.35 6.34 12.02
MT 8.62 42.84 52.14 10.75 42.23 50.20 7.98 38.29 47.01
NE 1.35 2.29 8.02 36.28 37.84 43.69 12.59 13.80 17.45
NC 23.11 5.25 14.47 3.30 16.96 22.27 21.84 4.90 12.44
ND 3.20 14.38 20.21 23.62 41.11 44.94 9.78 21.31 25.29
OH 4.33 16.22 21.34 4.12 16.38 20.59 2.28 14.77 19.60
OK 19.65 29.35 39.23 43.69 55.15 65.84 26.83 33.28 41.26
PA 22.29 20.98 28.29 1.64 26.11 31.77 22.67 15.50 21.60
SC 20.38 18.18 21.81 0.76 18.53 21.95 21.08 15.31 18.56
SD 3.74 19.11 28.84 10.50 28.46 36.76 3.59 17.96 26.28
TN 1.41 4.37 7.71 3.41 8.49 11.99 20.33 2.17 5.04
TX 23.35 5.24 16.58 20.84 6.55 17.12 23.68 3.00 12.61
VA 20.25 14.95 21.88 5.60 27.37 32.83 20.29 11.66 16.81
WI 0.89 23.48 26.52 7.55 30.80 33.97 2.79 23.22 25.20
Average 2.35 14.12 20.40 13.82 27.32 33.00 5.13 15.24 20.38
Coble and Barnett: Integrated Commodity Programs and Crop Insurance 437But again the results vary dramatically across
states. The greatest reductions occur in wheat-
producing states and in the heart of the
Cornbelt.
Figures 1–4 provide further details on the
effects of wrapping for Iowa, Texas, North
Dakota, and Mississippi. The findings are
presented as probability distributions of loss
cost. The distributions are generated by
applying kernel smoothing to the simulated
loss cost outcomes. Recall that the potential
for extreme loss events has provided the
primary justification for federal involvement
in providing reinsurance for federal crop
insurance policies. Figures 1–4 allow one to
see how wrapping affects the right tail of the
loss cost distribution. The CRC results are not
included in the figures because they tend to fall
between the RA and APH results.
Figure 1 presents loss cost distributions for
Iowa. In both the APH and RA scenarios
substantial right skewness is observed. This is
particularly true of the no-wrap APH scenar-
io. A similar right tail is observed for RA,
though it is not so extreme. The state and
county wraps substantially reduce, but do not
eliminate, the extreme right tails.
The results for Texas are presented in
Figure 2. Texas has much higher loss costs
than Iowa. The probability distributions of
loss cost are also right-skewed, but not as
much as in Iowa. For both APH and RA
wrapping around a national revenue–triggered
commodity program does not significantly
reduce the right-skewness of the loss cost
distribution. The state and especially the
county wrap do much more to reduce the
right tail of the loss cost distribution.
Figure 1. Distribution of Simulated Iowa APH and RA Loss Cost with Alternative Wraps
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Mississippi and North Dakota, respectively.
In Mississippi, APH loss cost distributions
show little response to wrapping, while RA
loss cost distributions show much more
response. In contrast, the variability of North
Dakota APH and RA loss cost distributions is
greatly reduced by state and county wraps.
Conclusions
The concept of wrapping crop insurance
around an aggregate commodity program was
at the forefront of the farm bill debate in 2007.
While it appears at this time that revenue pro-
grams are a likely farm bill outcome, wrapping
is not. However, budget pressure and a desire
to reign in crop insurance A&O costs may
cause this issue to be revisited. We would note
that this simulation has not focused on the
practical implications of modifying the current
loss cost–based insurance rating system to
accommodate proposed wrapping legislation,
which in our opinion can only be evaluated by
simulations such as this one.
6 However, the
mean effects of wrapping are shown to vary
dramatically by region. In general, the reduc-
tion in government cost would tend to be
greatest in wheat-growing Plains states and
least in cotton-producing states.
While wrapping was suggested largely as a
cost-savings measure, our results show that
6The loss-cost based rating system for APH is
based on historical loss cost experience. The revenue
insurance programs make distributional assumptions
regarding the price risk and price–yield correlation.
The relationship of these components and aggregate
revenue is not entirely clear.
Figure 2. Distribution of Simulated Texas APH and RA Loss Cost with Alternative Wraps
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loss-cost distributions as well. As expected,
wrapping does remove systemic risk from crop
insurance portfolios. In some instances, the
standard deviations of the state portfolios
considered here were reduced by as much as
half. However, the results varied dramatically
by state and insurance product. The portfolio
risk reduction achieved by wrapping insurance
around an area revenue–triggered commodity
program was greater for RA than for CRC
and greater for CRC than for APH. Further,
we find that, in some cases, wrapping sub-
stantially reduces the right tail of the loss cost
distribution. This is especially true when a
state or county revenue–triggered commodity
program is used. However, we also find states
where wrapping has little effect on the
distribution of loss cost.
An implication of these findings is that
wrapping crop insurance around an area
revenue–triggered commodity program does
tend to undermine the primary argument for
federal involvement in providing reinsurance.
This is particularly true for RA insurance
when the underlying commodity program
triggers at the state or county level. Thus, if
wrapping were instituted, it would, in many
respects, duplicate the effects of the current
standard reinsurance agreement between the
federal government and private crop insurance
companies. However, even with wrapping,
some state portfolios still exhibit problematic
right tails.
Figure 3. Distribution of Simulated Mississippi APH and RA Loss Cost with Alternative
Wraps
440 Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, August 2008If wrapping was instituted, the standard
reinsurance agreement would need to be
modified to account for the effects of wrap-
ping on insurers’ portfolios. In particular, the
standard reinsurance agreement should focus
on stop-loss protection against events in the
extreme right tail of the loss cost distribution
while allowing private reinsurance markets to
cover the remaining portfolio risk.
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